## **20 DECEMBER 2021**



# **Thailand Diversified Financials**

# JVs between banks and AMCs on the table again

- The BoT might allow the establishment of JVs between banks and AMCs to solve the potential influx of NPLs, which could be announced in December 2021.
- We read the JV concept as positive for the AMC sector. Although JVs might not significantly affect AMCs' profits in the next one to two years, we think their valuations might rerate first due to the potentially brighter and more sustainable outlook.
- We maintain our OVERWEIGHT call on AMCs. JMT and BAM are our most preferred.

### JVs between banks and AMCs potentially announced in December 2021

According to the Prachachart newspaper, the Bank of Thailand (BoT) is likely to allow the establishment of JVs between banks and asset management companies (AMCs) to solve the potential influx of non-performing loans (NPLs) from the Covid pandemic, which could be announced in December 2021.

# BAM could benefit the most, followed by JMT

To motivate the establishment of JVs, we think the BoT could 1) allow AMCs and banks to deconsolidate JVs from their own financial statements to reduce the burden on their balance sheets; and 2) lift restrictions on the source of funds that banks can provide to JVs (from currently not over 25% of JVs' liabilities). In our view, banks might prefer to partner with AMCs which have outstanding NPL management capabilities and notable experience. Thus, we believe all AMCs under our coverage (especially BAM and JMT) could be targets for partnership. In the event that the BoT unlocks sources of funding for JVs, BAM would likely benefit the most due to its longer cash cycle and more constrained D/E vs its peers.

### Immaterial change to fundamentals in next 1-2 years; valuations could rerate first

We see three benefits to AMCs that might partner with banks. First, AMCs should be able expand their businesses at a faster pace from the secure NPL backlog and unlimited source of funds from banks. Second, AMCs would receive NPL management fees from the JVs. Third, AMCs would realise a share of profits from the JVs. We think it is still too difficult to identify the net incremental benefits to AMCs. JVs could be loss makers in the first one to two years of establishment due to the nature of the bad debt management business. However, AMCs would receive compensation from management fees. Hence, we believe JVs might not significantly affect AMCs' profits in the next one to two years. However, we think their valuations might rerate first due to the brighter and more sustainable outlook.

## AMCs are our most preferred in the diversified financial sector

Apart from the potential announcement of JV licenses, the BoT announced a public hearing regarding a change in AMC law, i.e. allowing AMCs to provide services to government financial agencies. We read the new mandates as positive overall for the AMC segment. Among our coverage, we believe that AMCs are the most attractive in the diversified financial sector, as we believe that asset management is probably one of the few industries whose current regulations favour their operations. We also think AMCs have a limited competitive landscape. These factors should lead to outstanding 2022E net profit growth of 52%. Thus, we maintain our Overweight rating. JMT and BAM are our most preferred.



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
### JVs between banks and AMCs could be announced in Dec 2021

Although the banking sector's NPLs have increased insignificantly for six consecutive quarters since 2Q20 due to the loan classification relaxation measures by the BoT, we believe that after the measure ends in 2023, NPLs should increase moderately. Thus, we believe that the BoT will have to issue some rules to solve the potential NPL influx. We take the 1997 Asian financial crisis as an example.

After the surge of NPLs during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the BoT and the government put a lot of effort into solving bad debts, including:

- 1) The establishment of the Financial Restructuring Authority (FRA) in 1997 to liquidate assets from 56 shuttered finance companies;
- 2) Allowing banks to set up their own AMCs;
- 3) The establishment of national AMCs, including: Bangkok Commercial Asset Management (BAM), Sukhumvit Asset Management (SAM, not listed); and Thai Asset Management Corporation (TAMC, dissolved).

Exhibit 1: Previous national AMC timeline



Source: FSSIA's compilation

Due to the delay in resolving NPLs via the FRA and existing AMCs, TAMC was set up to operate under a special law. TAMC was able to bypass the process of the Legal Execution Office and directly sell repossessed assets through its own channels, resulting in a shorter litigation process. The regulation allowed TAMC to operate for only ten years. It was dissolved in 2011.

Currently, establishing a new national AMC would be a difficult task, in our view, as it would require a huge capital injection from the government. Instead, the concept of establishing JVs between banks and AMCs could be a good solution to solve bad asset quality – both NPLs and non-performing assets (NPAs). According to Prachachart (local newspaper), the BoT is likely to allow the establishment of JVs between banks and AMCs, which could be announced in December 2021. We have also followed up with some banks and AMCs and they provided the same information, that the BoT wants to initiate JVs between banks and AMCs.

# BAM could benefit the most, followed by JMT


To motivate the establishment of JVs, we think the BoT could 1) allow AMCs and banks to deconsolidate JVs from their own financial statements to reduce the burden on their balance sheets (liabilities for AMCs and NPLs for banks); and 2) lift restrictions on the source of funds that banks can provide to JVs (from currently not over 25% of JVs' liabilities). In our view, banks might prefer to partner with AMCs which have outstanding NPL management capabilities and notable experience. Thus, we believe all AMCs under our coverage (especially BAM and JMT) could be targets for partnership. In the event that the BoT unlocks sources of funding for JVs, BAM would likely benefit the most, as BAM has a more conservative NPL acquisition plan than its peers due to its longer cash cycle and more constrained D/E.

Exhibit 2: AMCs under our coverage – NPL acquisition forecasts

AMCs	AMCs Asset type		ion for the acquisition o	f NPLs
		2021E	2022E	2023E
		(THB m)	(THB m)	(THB m)
BAM	Secured	2,943	7,651	8,416
	Unsecured			
	Total	2,943	7,651	8,416
CHAYO	Secured	1,374	909	697
	Unsecured	316	273	131
	Total	1,689	1,182	828
JMT	Secured	7,200	8,000	12,000
	Unsecured	1,800	2,000	3,000
	Total	9,000	10,000	15,000
Total NPL purchase	Secured	11,516	16,560	21,112
	Unsecured	2,116	2,273	3,131
Combined total NPL p	urchase	13,632	18,833	24,243


Sources: Company data; FSSIA estimates

**Exhibit 3: BAM's NPL acquisitions** 



Sources: BAM; FSSIA's estimates

Exhibit 4: BAM's D/E ratio



Sources: BAM; FSSIA's estimates

# Immaterial change to fundamentals; valuations could rerate first

We believe that JVs would benefit all parties, including AMCs, the banking sector and the economy as a whole. We see three benefits to AMCs. First, AMCs should be able expand their businesses at a faster pace. JVs would have secure NPL backlogs from banks at reasonable acquisition prices. We also believe that funding for JVs would be provided by banks. This could unlock a limited source of funds for AMCs. Second, AMCs would receive NPL management fees from the JVs. We believe JVs would hire their own partner AMCs to manage NPLs instead of hiring all new staff. This would allow AMCs to more efficiently utilise their resources and earn cash faster vs solely running their own NPL management. Third, AMCs would realise a share of profits from the JVs.

We believe that AMCs that decide to partner with banks will continue to purchase and manage NPLs at their own level as usual. To us, partnering with banks would not decrease AMCs' original profits. Instead, we believe there would be additional benefits from the JVs.

Exhibit 5: Potential net benefits to AMCs when setting up a 49% holding JV with a bank to manage secured NPLs

	2022E	2023E	2024E
	(THB m)	(THB m)	(THB m)
Assumptions			
NPL acquisition	1,000		
Cash collection (%)	5	20	20
Management fee to total outstanding NPL acquisition (%)	5	13	15
Profit and Loss			
Interest income (net Interest expense and ECL)	15	65	185
Management fee	50	125	150
Other OPEX	20	30	40
Tax	0	0	0
Net profit	(55.00)	(60.00)	35.00
Benefit to AMC (holding 49% in JV)			
Share loss/gain from JV	(27)	(29)	17
Management fee (net of tax)	40	100	120
Net benefit to AMC	13	71	137

Source: FSSIA estimates

We think it is still too difficult to identify the net incremental profits to AMCs in the case of setting up a JV with a bank. It would depend on many factors such as the structure of the JV's shareholders, the JV's NPL acquisitions, NPL management fees, and types of NPLs to manage. We can provide a preliminary idea that the net benefit that AMCs might receive in the first one to two years would likely not be very high. In our view, the JV may still be a loss maker in the first one to two years due to the nature of the bad debt management business, and the collection rate in the first two years would not likely accelerate much. However, AMCs would receive compensation from management fees. We think that the management fee would be 10-20% of total outstanding bad assets (based on JMT and CHAYO's debt collection business and our calculation). Accordingly, we believe that partnering with banks might not significantly affect AMCs' profits in the next one to two years. However, we think their valuations might rerate first due to the brighter and more sustainable outlook.

# Changing AMCs' mandates benefits all SET-listed AMCs

Apart from the potential announcement of JV licenses, the BoT announced a public hearing regarding a change in AMC law which will be held during 22 November 2021 to 21 December 2021. The BoT is likely to allow AMCs to provide debt collection services to public agencies selected by the Ministry of Finance. Moreover, the BoT could add more restrictions on registration requirements and governance for AMC licenses.

We think these changes would favour AMCs under our coverage. We think the new law would increase the potential number of clients – debtors in specialised financial institutions (SFIs) in particular – who AMCs can provide debt collection services to. As of 2020, SFIs had a high level of NPLs at THB186b (vs THB541b NPLs for commercial banks as of 3Q21) and delinquent loans of THB204b. On top of that, the stricter business conduct requirement would be a barrier to entry for new players.

**Exhibit 6: SFIs' outstanding NPLs** 





Exhibit 7: AMCs' 2020 debt servicing revenue




 $Sources: Fiscal\ Policy\ Office;\ FSSIA's\ compilation$ 

Sources: Company data; FSSIA's compilation


In our view, the potential mandate change for AMCs would benefit JMT and CHAYO the most, as they already operate large debt collection service businesses representing 9% and 6%, respectively, of their total revenue in 2020. We believe the changes would provide more opportunities for them to enhance their service.

Exhibit 8: BAM – one-year prospective P/E band




Sources: Bloomberg; FSSIA estimates

Exhibit 9: BAM – one-year prospective P/BV band



Sources: Bloomberg; FSSIA estimates

# Exhibit 10: CHAYO – one-year prospective P/E band




Sources: Bloomberg; FSSIA estimates

Exhibit 12: JMT – one-year prospective P/E band




Sources: Bloomberg; FSSIA estimates

Exhibit 11: CHAYO - one-year prospective P/BV band



Sources: Bloomberg; FSSIA estimates

Exhibit 13: JMT – one-year prospective P/BV band



Sources: Bloomberg; FSSIA estimates

Exhibit 14: Thailand diversified financials – peers comparison

	BBG	RecShare price		price	Up	Market	EPS g	rowth	P/E		ROE		P	PBV
	code		Current (THB)	Target (THB)	side (%)	Cap (USD m)	21E (%)	22E (%)	21E (x)	22E (x)	21E (%)	22E (%)	21E (x)	22E (x)
Diversified financials						23,188	12.1	22.8	26.3	21.4	18.4	18.0	4.2	3.3
Unsecured-loan lenders						5,833	14.3	13.1	21.0	18.5	24.0	23.4	4.7	4.1
Aeon Thana Sinsap (Thailand)	AEONTS TB	HOLD	189.00	204.00	8	1,419	7.5	13.9	11.9	10.5	21.5	21.1	2.4	2.1
Krungthai Card	KTC TB	HOLD	57.00	52.00	(9)	4,414	15.4	13.0	23.9	21.1	24.8	24.1	5.5	4.8
Auto-title lenders						9,411	5.3	23.2	23.6	19.1	20.3	20.6	4.1	3.6
Muangthai Capital	MTC TB	BUY	57.75	69.00	19	3,677	(0.5)	24.6	23.6	18.9	22.7	23.4	4.9	4.0
Srisawad Corp	SAWAD TB	BUY	61.50	80.00	30	2,536	4.2	20.6	17.8	14.7	20.2	22.0	3.4	3.1
Saksiam Leasing	SAK TB	BUY	10.70	11.00	3	674	(19.5)	39.1	37.8	27.1	12.6	15.9	4.6	4.1
Ngern Tid Lor	TIDLOR TB	BUY	36.25	43.00	19	2,525	23.8	17.8	25.5	21.7	18.9	16.4	3.7	3.3
Truck lenders						1,803	11.7	10.5	28.4	25.7	13.2	12.7	3.3	2.5
Micro Leasing	MICRO TB	BUY	8.15	10.70	31	229	23.1	33.5	37.4	28.0	10.8	13.2	3.9	3.5
Singer Thailand	SINGER TB	BUY	51.00	51.00	0	819	24.8	2.4	37.5	36.6	13.0	9.8	4.2	2.7
Ratchthani Leasing	THANI TB	BUY	4.44	4.80	8	755	(30.2)	19.8	15.8	13.2	14.2	15.8	2.2	2.0
Asset management						4,683	17.0	33.9	41.5	31.0	12.8	11.0	5.0	2.8
Bangkok Commercial Asset Mngt.	BAM TB	BUY	21.00	25.50	21	2,038	23.0	41.5	30.0	21.2	5.2	6.9	1.5	1.5
Chayo Group	CHAYO TB	BUY	12.40	18.80	52	358	18.5	39.6	48.4	34.6	12.8	11.7	4.3	3.5
JMT Network Services	JMT TB	BUY	63.00	70.00	11	2,287	13.6	29.5	50.7	39.1	19.5	14.5	8.3	3.8
Other						1,189	8.1	11.6	9.6	8.6	6.4	6.8	0.6	0.6
Thanachart Capital	TCAP TB	HOLD	37.75	35.00	(7)	1,189	8.1	11.6	9.6	8.6	6.4	6.8	0.6	0.6
Hire purchase motorcycle						269	55.9	33.4	28.5	21.3	17.4	19.8	4.6	3.9
Next Capital	NCAP TB	BUY	9.95	16.80	69	269	55.9	33.4	28.5	21.3	17.4	19.8	4.6	3.9

Share prices as of 17 Dec 2021 Sources: Bloomberg; FSSIA estimates

# Corporate Governance report of Thai listed companies 2020

EXCELLE	NT LEVEL									
\AV	ADVANC	AF	AIRA	AKP	AKR	ALT	AMA	AMATA	AMATAV	ANAN
TOA	AP	ARIP	ARROW	ASP	BAFS	BANPU	BAY	BCP	BCPG	BDMS
BEC	BEM	BGRIM	BIZ	BKI	BLA	BOL	BPP	BRR	BTS	BWG
CENTEL	CFRESH	CHEWA	CHO	CIMBT	CK	CKP	CM	CNT	COL	COMAN
COTTO	CPALL	CPF	CPI	CPN	CSS	DELTA	DEMCO	DRT	DTAC	DTC
DV8	EA	EASTW	ECF	ECL	EGCO	EPG	ETE	FNS	FPI	FPT
SMART	GBX	GC	GCAP	GEL	GFPT	GGC	GPSC	GRAMMY	GUNKUL	HANA
HARN	HMPRO	ICC	ICHI	III	ILINK	INTUCH	IRPC	IVL	JKN	JSP
IWD	K	KBANK	KCE	KKP	KSL	KTB	KTC	LANNA	LH	LHFG
_IT	LPN	MAKRO	MALEE	MBK	MBKET	MC	MCOT	METCO	MFEC	MINT
MONO	MOONG	MSC	MTC	NCH	NCL	NEP	NKI	NOBLE	NSI	NVD
NYT	OISHI	ORI	ОТО	PAP	PCSGH	PDJ	PG	PHOL	PLANB	PLANET
PLAT	PORT	PPS	PR9	PREB	PRG	PRM	PSH	PSL	PTG	PTT
PTTEP	PTTGC	PYLON	Q-CON	QH	QTC	RATCH	RS	S	S&J	SAAM
SABINA	SAMART	SAMTEL	SAT	SC	SCB	SCC	SCCC	SCG	SCN	SDC
SEAFCO	SEAOIL	SE-ED	SELIC	SENA	SIRI	SIS	SITHAI	SMK	SMPC	SNC
SONIC	SORKON	SPALI	SPI	SPRC	SPVI	SSSC	SST	STA	SUSCO	SUTHA
SVI	SYMC	SYNTEC	TACC	TASCO	TCAP	TFMAMA	THANA	THANI	THCOM	THG
HIP	THRE	THREL	TIP	TIPCO	TISCO	TK	TKT	TTB	TMILL	TNDT
NL	TOA	TOP	TPBI	TQM	TRC	TSC	TSR	TSTE	TSTH	TTA
TTCL	TTW	TU	TVD	TVI	TVO	TWPC	U	UAC	UBIS	UV
/GI	VIH	WACOAL	WAVE	WHA	WHAUP	WICE	WINNER	TRUE	05.0	<b>.</b>
	VII I	WACOAL	**A*E	VVI 1/A	VVIIAUF	VVIOE	ANHAUNEL			
ERY GOO	OD LEVEL									
2S	ABM	ACE	ACG	ADB	AEC	AEONTS	AGE	AH	AHC	AIT
ALLA	AMANAH	AMARIN	APCO	APCS	APURE	AQUA	ASAP	ASEFA	ASIA	ASIAN
ASIMAR	ASK	ASN	ATP30	AUCT	AWC	AYUD	В	BA	BAM	BBL
BFIT	BGC	BJC	BJCHI	BROOK	BTW	CBG	CEN	CGH	CHARAN	CHAYO
CHG	CHOTI	CHOW	CI	CIG	CMC	COLOR	COM7	CPL	CRC	CRD
CSC	CSP	CWT	DCC	DCON	DDD	DOD	DOHOME	EASON	EE	ERW
ESTAR	FE	FLOYD	FN	FORTH	FSS	FTE	FVC	GENCO	GJS	GL
GLAND	GLOBAL	GLOCON	GPI	GULF	GYT	HPT	HTC	ICN	IFS	ILM
MH	INET	INSURE	IRC	IRCP	IT	ITD	ITEL	J	JAS	JCK
ICKH	JMART	JMT	KBS	KCAR	KGI	KIAT	KOOL	KTIS	KWC	KWM
_&E	LALIN	LDC	LHK	LOXLEY	LPH	LRH	LST	M	MACO	MAJOR
MBAX	MEGA	META	MFC	MGT	MILL	MITSIB	MK	MODERN	MTI	MVP
NETBAY	NEX	NINE	NTV	NWR	occ	OGC	OSP	PATO	PB	PDG
PDI	PICO	PIMO	PJW	PL	PM	PPP	PRIN	PRINC	PSTC	PT
QLT	RCL	RICHY	RML	RPC	RWI	S11	SALEE	SAMCO	SANKO	SAPPE
SAWAD	SCI	SCP	SE	SEG	SFP	SGF	SHR	SIAM	SINGER	SKE
	SKY					SPC	SPCG		SRICHA	SSC
SKR		SMIT	SMT	SNP	SPA			SR		
SSF	STANLY	STI	STPI	SUC	SUN	SYNEX	T	TAE	TAKUNI	TBSP
CC	TCMC	TEAM	TEAMG	TFG	TIGER	TITLE	TKN	TKS	TM	TMC
ΓMD	TMI	TMT	TNITY	TNP	TNR	TOG	TPA	TPAC	TPCORP	TPOLY
TPS .	TRITN	TRT	TRU	TSE	TVT	TWP	UEC	UMI	UOBKH	UP
JPF	UPOIC	UT	UTP	UWC	VL	VNT	VPO	WIIK	WP	XO
'UASA	ZEN	ZIGA	ZMICO							
GOOD LEV	VEL									
UP	A	ABICO	AJ	ALL	ALUCON	AMC	APP	ARIN	AS	AU
352	BC	BCH	BEAUTY	BGT	BH	BIG	BKD	BLAND	BM	BR
BROCK	BSBM	BSM	BTNC	CAZ	CCP	CGD	CITY	CMAN	CMO	CMR
CPT	CPW	CRANE	CSR	D D	EKH	EP	ESSO	FMT	GIFT	GREEN
SSC	GTB	HTECH	HUMAN	IHL	INOX	INSET	IP	JTS	JUBILE	KASET
CM	KKC	KUMWEL	KUN	KWG	KYE	LEE	MATCH	MATI	M-CHAI	MCS
ИDX	MJD	MM	MORE	NC	NDR	NER	NFC	NNCL	NPK	NUSA
DCEAN	PAF	PF	PK	PLE	PMTA	POST	PPM	PRAKIT	PRECHA	PRIME
PROUD	PTL	RBF	RCI	RJH	ROJNA	RP	RPH	RSP	SF	SFLEX
SGP	SISB	SKN	SLP	SMART	SOLAR	SPG	SQ	SSP	STARK	STC
SUPER	SVOA	TC	TCCC	THMUI	TIW	TNH	TOPP	TPCH	TPIPP	TPLAS
TI	TYCN	UKEM	UMS	VCOM	VRANDA	WIN	WORK	WPH		
		Description						Score F	Range	
		Excellent						90-1	00	
		Very Good						80-8	39	

The disclosure of the survey results of the Thai Institute of Directors Association ('IOD") regarding corporate governance is made pursuant to the policy of the Office of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The survey of the IOD is based on the information of a company listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand and the Market for Alternative Investment disclosed to the public and able to be accessed by a general public investor. The result, therefore, is from the perspective of a third party. It is not an evaluation of operation and is not based on inside information.

The survey result is as of the date appearing in the Corporate Governance Report of Thai Listed Companies. As a result, the survey results may be changed after that date. FSS International Investment Advisory Company Limited does not confirm nor certify the accuracy of such survey results.

\* CGR scoring should be considered with news regarding wrong doing of the company or director or executive of the company such unfair practice on securities trading, fraud,

Source: Thai Institute of Directors Association (IOD); FSSIA's compilation

and corruption SEC imposed a civil sanction against insider trading of director and executive; \*\* delisted

# **Anti-corruption Progress Indicator 2020**

CERTIFIED										
2S	ADVANC	Al	AIE	AIRA	AKP	AMA	AMANAH	AP	AQUA	ARROW
ASK	ASP	AYUD	В	BAFS	BANPU	BAY	BBL	всн	ВСР	BCPG
BGC	BGRIM	BJCHI	BKI	BLA	BPP	BROOK	BRR	BSBM	BTS	BWG
CEN	CENTEL	CFRESH	CGH	CHEWA	CHOTI	CHOW	CIG	CIMBT	CM	CMC
COL	COM7	CPALL	CPF	CPI	CPN	CSC	DCC	DELTA	DEMCO	DIMET
DRT	DTAC	DTC	EASTW	ECL	EGCO	FE	FNS	FPI	FPT	FSS
FTE	GBX	GC	GCAP	GEL	GFPT	GGC	GJS	GPSC	GSTEEL	GUNKUL
HANA	HARN	HMPRO	HTC	ICC	ICHI	IFS	INET	INSURE	INTUCH	IRPC
ITEL	IVL	K	KASET	KBANK	KBS	KCAR	KCE	KGI	KKP	KSL
KTB	KTC	KWC	L&E	LANNA	LHFG	LHK	LPN	LRH	M	MAKRO
MALEE	MBAX	MBK	MBKET	MC	MCOT	MFC	MFEC	MINT	MONO	MOONG
MPG	MSC	MTC	MTI	NBC	NEP	NINE	NKI	NMG	NNCL	NSI
NWR	occ	OCEAN	OGC	ORI	PAP	PATO	РВ	PCSGH	PDG	PDI
PDJ	PE	PG	PHOL	PL	PLANB	PLANET	PLAT	PM	PPP	PPPM
PPS	PREB	PRG	PRINC	PRM	PSH	PSL	PSTC	PT	PTG	PTT
PTTEP	PTTGC	PYLON	Q-CON	QH	QLT	QTC	RATCH	RML	RWI	S & J
SABINA	SAT	SC	SCB	SCC	SCCC	SCG	SCN	SEAOIL	SE-ED	SELIC
SENA	SGP	SIRI	SITHAI	SMIT	SMK	SMPC	SNC	SNP	SORKON	SPACK
SPC	SPI	SPRC	SRICHA	SSF	SSSC	SST	STA	SUSCO	SVI	SYNTEC
TAE	TAKUNI	TASCO	TBSP	TCAP	TCMC	TFG	TFI	TFMAMA	THANI	THCOM
THIP	THRE	THREL	TIP	TIPCO	TISCO	TKT	TTB	TMD	TMILL	TMT
TNITY	TNL	TNP	TNR	TOG	TOP	TPA	TPCORP	TPP	TRU	TSC
TSTH	TTCL	TU	TVD	TVI	TVO	TWPC	U	UBIS	UEC	UKEM
UOBKH	UWC	VGI	VIH	VNT	WACOAL	WHA	WHAUP	WICE	WIIK	XO
ZEN	TRUE									
DECLARED	)									
7UP	ABICO	AF	ALT	AMARIN	AMATA	AMATAV	ANAN	APURE	B52	BKD
ВМ	BROCK	BUI	СНО	CI	сотто	DDD	EA	EFORL	EP	ERW
ESTAR	ETE	EVER	FSMART	GPI	ILINK	IRC	J	JKN	JMART	JMT
JSP	JTS	KWG	LDC	MAJOR	META	NCL	NOBLE	NOK	PK	PLE
ROJNA	SAAM	SAPPE	SCI	SE	SHANG	SINGER	SKR	SPALI	SSP	STANLY
SUPER	SYNEX	THAI	TKS	TOPP	TRITN	TTA	UPF	UV	WIN	ZIGA

### Level

Certified

This level indicates practical participation with thoroughly examination in relation to the recommended procedures from the audit committee or the SEC's certified auditor, being a certified member of Thailand's Private Sector Collective Action Coalition Against Corruption programme (Thai CAC) or already passed examination to ensure independence from external parties.

Declared This level indicates determination to participate in the Thailand's Private Sector Collective Action Coalition Against Corruption programme (Thai CAC)

### Disclaimer:

The disclosure of the Anti-Corruption Progress Indicators of a listed company on the Stock Exchange of Thailand, which is assessed by Thaipat Institute, is made in order to comply with the policy and sustainable development plan for the listed companies of the Office of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Thaipat Institute made this assessment based on the information received from the listed company, as stipulated in the form for the assessment of Anti-corruption which refers to the Annual Registration Statement (Form 56-1), Annual Report (Form 56-2), or other relevant documents or reports of such listed company. The assessment result is therefore made from the perspective of Thaipat Institute that is a third party. It is not an assessment of operation and is not based on any inside information. Since this assessment is only the assessment result as of the date appearing in the assessment result, it may be changed after that date or when there is any change to the relevant information. Nevertheless, FSS International Investment Advisory Company Limited does not confirm, verify, or certify the accuracy and completeness of the assessment results.

Note: Companies participating in Thailand's Private Sector Collective Action Coalition Against Corruption programme (Thai CAC) under Thai Institute of Directors (as of June 24, 2019) are categorised into: 1) companies that have declared their intention to join CAC, and; 2) companies certified by CAC.

Source: The Securities and Exchange Commission, Thailand; \* FSSIA's compilation

### **GENERAL DISCLAIMER**

### ANALYST(S) CERTIFICATION

### Yuvanart Suwanumphai FSS International Investment Advisory Securities Co., Ltd

The individual(s) identified above certify(ies) that (i) all views expressed in this report accurately reflect the personal view of the analyst(s) with regard to any and all of the subject securities, companies or issuers mentioned in this report; and (ii) no part of the compensation of the analyst(s) was, is, or will be, directly or indirectly, related to the specific recommendations or views expressed herein.

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Company	Ticker	Price	Rating	Valuation & Risks
Aeon Thana Sinsap (Thailand	d) AEONTS TB	THB 189.00	HOLD	Downside risks to our GGM-derived TP include 1) intense competition; 2) regulatory actions to curb industry growth; and 3) deteriorating asset quality. The upside risk is stronger-than-expected asset quality.
Krungthai Card	КТС ТВ	THB 57.00	HOLD	Upside risks to our GGM-derived TP include 1) stronger-than-expected growth for KTB Leasing; and 2) a better-than-expected bad debt recovery. Downside risks are 1) regulatory actions to curb industry growth; and 2) deteriorating asset quality.
Muangthai Capital	МТС ТВ	THB 57.75	BUY	Downside risks to our GGM-based TP include 1) a further weakening of asset quality that could potentially hit both loan yield and credit cost; and 2) changes in financial regulations by the Bank of Thailand and the Office of Consumer Protection Board.
Srisawad Corp	SAWAD TB	THB 61.50	BUY	Downside risks to our GGM-based TP include 1) a further weakening of asset quality that could potentially hit both loan yield and credit cost; and 2) changes in financial regulations by the Bank of Thailand and the Office of Consumer Protection Board.
Saksiam Leasing	SAK TB	THB 10.70	BUY	Downside risks to our GGM-derived TP include 1) competition from existing and new players; 2) regulatory changes by the Bank of Thailand (BoT); and 3) a slower-than-expected reduction in its cost of funds due to a shift toward more long-term loans.
Ngern Tid Lor	TIDLOR TB	THB 36.25	BUY	Downside risks to our GGM-based TP include 1) the expansion into auto-title loans by the Government Savings Bank and Auto X (subsidiary of SCB); 2) further weakening asset quality could potentially hit both loan yield and credit cost; and 3) tighter supervision from related regulators.
Micro Leasing	MICRO TB	THB 8.15	BUY	Downside risks to our GGM-derived TP include 1) an economic slowdown, especially for logistics activities and private investment; 2) deteriorating asset quality; and 3) a slower-than-expected reduction in the cost of funds due to a shift toward more long-term loans.
Singer Thailand	SINGER TB	THB 51.00	BUY	Downside risks to our GGM-derived TP include 1) an economic slowdown leading to slower loan growth and lower sales of electrical products and home appliances; and 2) deteriorating asset quality.
Ratchthani Leasing	THANI TB	THB 4.44	BUY	Downside risks to our GGM-derived TP include 1) an economic slowdown, especially for logistics activities and private investment; 2) deteriorating asset quality; and 3) changes in financial regulations from the Bank of Thailand.
Bangkok Commercial Asset Mngt.	BAM TB	THB 21.00	BUY	Downside risks to our GGM-based TP include 1) lower cash collection from its fully amortised portfolio; 2) lower-than-expected bad debt acquisition; and 3) the prolonged slowdown of the property market.
Chayo Group	СНАҮО ТВ	THB 12.40	BUY	Downside risks to our GGM-based TP include 1) lower-than-expected bad debt acquisition; and 2) higher-than-expected operating expenses.
JMT Network Services	JMT TB	THB 63.00	BUY	Downside risks to our GGM-based TP include 1) lower cash collection from its fully amortised portfolio; and 2) the lower-than-expected acquisition of new bad debt.
Thanachart Capital	TCAP TB	THB 37.75	HOLD	Upside risks to our GGM-based target price are M&A completions and long-term synergy gained, leading to a higher contribution to its earnings. Downside risks are impacts from a prolonged weak macro outlook on loan growth and asset quality which could lead to higher provisions for both TMB and THANI.
Next Capital	NCAP TB	THB 9.95	BUY	Downside risks to our GGM-derived TP include 1) an economic slowdown, especially for food delivery and logistics activities; 2) deteriorating asset quality; and 3) tighter competition from new players.

Source: FSSIA estimates

### **Additional Disclosures**

Target price history, stock price charts, valuation and risk details, and equity rating histories applicable to each company rated in this report is available in our most recently published reports. You can contact the analyst named on the front of this note or your representative at Finansia Syrus Securities Public Company Limited

FSSIA may incorporate the recommendations and target prices of companies currently covered by FSS Research into equity research reports, denoted by an 'FSS' before the recommendation. FSS Research is part of Finansia Syrus Securities Public Company Limited, which is the parent company of FSSIA.

All share prices are as at market close on 17-Dec-2021 unless otherwise stated.

### RECOMMENDATION STRUCTURE

### Stock ratings

Stock ratings are based on absolute upside or downside, which we define as (target price\* - current price) / current price.

BUY (B). The upside is 10% or more.

HOLD (H). The upside or downside is less than 10%.

REDUCE (R). The downside is 10% or more.

Unless otherwise specified, these recommendations are set with a 12-month horizon. Thus, it is possible that future price volatility may cause a temporary mismatch between upside/downside for a stock based on market price and the formal recommendation.

\* In most cases, the target price will equal the analyst's assessment of the current fair value of the stock. However, if the analyst doesn't think the market will reassess the stock over the specified time horizon due to a lack of events or catalysts, then the target price may differ from fair value. In most cases, therefore, our recommendation is an assessment of the mismatch between current market price and our assessment of current fair value.

### **Industry Recommendations**

Overweight. The analyst expects the fundamental conditions of the sector to be positive over the next 12 months.

Neutral. The analyst expects the fundamental conditions of the sector to be maintained over the next 12 months.

Underweight. The analyst expects the fundamental conditions of the sector to be negative over the next 12 months.

### Country (Strategy) Recommendations

**Overweight (O).** Over the next 12 months, the analyst expects the market to score positively on two or more of the criteria used to determine market recommendations: index returns relative to the regional benchmark, index sharpe ratio relative to the regional benchmark and index returns relative to the market cost of equity.

**Neutral (N).** Over the next 12 months, the analyst expects the market to score positively on one of the criteria used to determine market recommendations: index returns relative to the regional benchmark, index sharpe ratio relative to the regional benchmark and index returns relative to the market cost of equity

**Underweight (U).** Over the next 12 months, the analyst does not expect the market to score positively on any of the criteria used to determine market recommendations: index returns relative to the regional benchmark, index sharpe ratio relative to the regional benchmark and index returns relative to the market cost of equity.